from direct loans to commercial loans persists. The FSA information web-site on direct loans states, "FSA provides temporary credit to its direct loan borrowers; therefore, all borrowers are required to refinance their loans with a private, commercial lender when they are financially able to do so." 2 To evaluate the efficacy of the FSA direct FLP, it is necessary to analyze actual borrower graduation rates and individuals' reasons for exiting the direct FLP. The analysis presented in this study utilizes data from a nationwide survey of borrower applications for direct loans originated in fiscal years (FY) 1994 (FY) -1996 . In this survey farm loan managers (FLMs) at the field office level were asked to indicate the reason borrowers no longer holding active direct loans exited the direct FLP. 3 In increasing program effectiveness, which can be partially measured as increasing the proportion of borrowers who exit the direct FLP, it is important to know the characteristics of borrowers at the time of loan origination that are indicators of the likely disposition of the borrower a number of years into the future. Such analysis is provided here by using a multinomial logit model that predicts the probability of a given type of outcome as a function of observable characteristics at the time of loan origination.
In what follows, background on the FSA direct FLP is presented to describe the program and various features of the program that would lead to differential reasons for exiting the direct FLP. In particular, FSA is mandated to make loans to beginning farmers and socially disadvantaged farmers. It is important in assessing the success and effectiveness of these two programs to determine if these programs have different exit probabilities and how they differ in the particular types of exits chosen. Next, the data collection process is described and basic descriptive statistics are presented for borrowers and their outcomes. Then a multinomial logit model predicting exit status is estimated and the results are interpreted. Conclusions and implications for FSA policy are then presented.
FSA Direct FLP Loans
There are three main types of FSA direct loans: (1) OL loans are for one or seven years and may be used to purchase equipment and livestock, pay operating and family living expenses, and refinance debts under certain conditions; (2) farm ownership (FO) loans may be used to purchase land, construct buildings, and promote soil and water conservation; and (3) emergency (EM) loans may be used to replace essential property, pay operating and family living expenses, and refinance certain debts following a natural disaster. Program limits are $200,000 each for OL and FO loans and $500,000 for EM loans. Unlike guaranteed loans, the upper limits on direct loan indebtedness are not tied to an inflation index and are changed infrequently. The limits on OL and FO loans have not been changed for at least two decades and the limit on EM loans has been tightened so that $500,000 is the maximum limit of indebtedness regardless of the number of disasters.
The targeting of FSA loans to specific borrower subgroups of socially disadvantaged and beginning farmers is mandated by law. FSA defines a socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher as "one of a group whose members have been subjected to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice because of their identity as members of the group without regard to their individual qualities. For purposes of FSA programs, socially disadvantaged (SDA) groups are women, African Americans, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, and Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders." (USDA/FSA, 2005b 1996. So all loans had at least eight years to terminate and 16% of the OL loans did not.
These loans have likely been restructured or consolidated.
The mean lengths of time to loan termination are also displayed in Table 2 . As expected, OL loans have much shorter durations than FO loans. The mean FO loan length will increase as more of these loans are paid back. A similar effect will occur with OL loans but since the proportion of OL loans still active is so much smaller than for FO loans, the increase in OL loan length will likely be less than for FO loans. One-year loans make up about half of the OL loans in each OL category in Table 2 . Ninety-one percent of the one-year loans are terminated and 74% of seven-year loans are also terminated. Given the short durations of the mean loan length times, it is clear that many seven-year loans terminated early. The mean lengths of OL one-year loans exceed the maturity and this is surprising. Since these are typically annual operating loans, it would be expected they would be paid back on time. As shown in Nwoha et al., the mean length of OL loans paid in full is less than when paid in full loans are combined with loans terminated in other ways. The means for all loan lengths are affected by problem loans. Nwoha et al. estimate that 89% of the terminated loans were paid-in-full. Table 3 gives the percentages of loans whose borrowers had exited the direct FLP Several facts stand out in Table 3 . First, the most frequent type of exit was graduation to conventional credit, i.e., not a transitional step through FSA guaranteed loan programs. Only 9.1% of those exiting the direct FLP used FSA guarantees. This result is surprising since we expected a larger proportion. Overall, fewer than half the exiting borrowers continued farming with credit (with and without FSA loan guarantees).
An exception to this behavior is FOBF where 62% of the exiting borrowers used conventional credit and another 8.5% had conventional credit with FSA guarantees. This indicates program success since these beginning farmers used the direct FLP early on and then graduated and continued farming with credit from conventional sources.
About 10% of those exiting continued farming and no longer needed credit. This could imply any number of things such as scaling back the operation, finally paying off all loans, or obtaining alternative sources of income to support the farm operation. It could also involve leasing some or most land or sale of some farming assets. The reasons
were not collected in the survey. Overall, 53.4% of the loans had exiting farmers who graduated, i.e., continued farming without direct FLP assistance.
Borrowers left farming voluntarily for reasons other than retirement (23.7% of all exited loans) and for retirement (6.9%). Five percent of the loans were terminated due to the farmer's death.
Only about 11% of loans had borrowers who left involuntarily. The highest proportion of borrowers leaving involuntarily was for the OLBFSDA assistance type but the proportion, 20%, has a large standard error so that the rate is no different from the others listed except for regular FO (FOREG) and FOBF. Rates of involuntary exit were higher for regular OL (OLREG) and OLBF than their FO counterparts. Rates for beginning farmers were not statistically different from those for non-beginning farmers within the OL and FO programs, respectively. contains those who left farming involuntarily other than death. 10 The reduction to four categories from eight reduces the number of parameters estimated and also provides four alternatives that satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which more numerous categories might not.
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The formula for multinomial models is well known, see Greene for example. In lieu of presenting the estimated logit parameters directly, which do not have an intuitive interpretation, the estimated marginal probabilities for each variable and category are presented. The marginal probability of an outcome is the change in the probability of the particular outcome for a one-unit change in an independent variable. 12 Standard errors for these marginal probabilities are computed using the analytical framework for the continuous variables and a bootstrap method for the binary independent variables.
The empirical model was specified with the goal of including those explanatory variables most likely to predict which borrowers exited the program and how they exited.
The explanatory variables are those observed during the loan approval process. This is the only information FSA has when evaluating a potential borrower. While knowledge of the events that occurred subsequent to loan origination and before November 30, 2004, would provide more precise results for explaining current status, the available data are sufficient to address the purpose of identifying pre-origination predictive variables.
The independent variables are grouped into four categories: (1) borrower demographics, (2) characteristics of the current loan, (3) prior financial distress and involvement with FSA direct loans, and (4) The financial variables are measured at the time of loan application. The debt-toasset ratio (DA) is defined as total debts divided by total assets. Both farm and non-farm debts and assets are included in the computation. It is expected that an increase in the DA increases the likelihood of the farmer being financially stressed and/or continuing in the program longer. Net worth (NETWORTH) is computed as total assets less total liabilities in millions of dollars. 13 The ratio of non-farm income to total cash farm income sources (NFINTCFI) measures income diversification as well as the ability to generate income to offset financial shortfalls from farming. 14 Repayment ability is measured as the balance available for debt service divided by total debt service due that year (REPAY). The final variable (TOTINC) is total annual household net cash income in millions of dollars. Borrowers with higher net worth, income diversification, repayment ability, and income should graduate from the direct FLP earlier than borrowers at lower levels of these variables.
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The Estimated Logit Model
The estimated model yields a number of statistically significant marginal probabilities as displayed in Table 5 . The sample had 1,928 observations. This is fewer than the 2,715 survey responders but an observation was included only if it had valid entries for all variables in the logit model for a given loan. The overall fit of the model can be appraised in three dimensions. First, the IIA assumption cannot be rejected.
Second, the likelihood ratio statistic measuring the overall significance of the coefficients firmly rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of all the variables simultaneously equal The statistically significant marginal probabilities generally have the anticipated signs. The category STATUS = 1 is of particular interest since it indicates borrowers are still holding one or more direct loans. The older the borrower at time of origination, the less likely they are to still be in the direct FLP. A ten-year difference would only alter the probability by 0.03. Non-white borrowers, as opposed to white borrowers, have a 0.15 higher probability of still having an FSA loan. Receiving an FO loan indicates a 0.14 higher probability of still being in the program. This is expected since FO loans are longer term. Furthermore, a majority of the FO borrowers are beginning farmers; and the interest rate for the beginning farmer down payment FO loans was 4.0% during FY 1994-1996, which was lower than market rates at the time (USDA/ERS, 1998). Thirtyeight percent of the FO loans in the sample were down payment loans. 17 Independently of whether the loan was FO or OL, beginning farmers are less likely to remain in the programs. These may be younger farmers that find farming is not as attractive as other opportunities they could pursue.
Not surprisingly, the longer the time since loan origination, the less likely a borrower is still to be in the program. This indicates that borrowers tend to leave the FSA likely success. RACE is a significant variable, and it is negative. The effect is substantial because the estimated coefficient, -0.1076, indicates that being a member of a non-white racial group means the probability of graduating declines by nearly .11.
Finally, the longer the time from origination, the more likely the borrower is to graduate.
Significant variables influencing the probability of leaving farming voluntarily or retiring (STATUS = 3) include demographic and loan type variables. Age is highly significant but its coefficient is small. The fact that "retired" is included in this category is probably a deciding factor in making the coefficient positive. It could alternatively be argued that younger farmers who perceive they have alternative lucrative, life-time job opportunities to farming might leave early. However, this argument is inconsistent with the positive age coefficient. The FO coefficient implies a 0.07 decline in the probability of voluntarily leaving farming or retiring compared with originators of EM or OL loans.
The probability of BF recipients of exiting voluntarily is higher by 0.09 than their non-BF counterparts.
Increasing 
Summary and Conclusions
The Farm Service Agency provides direct loans to creditworthy borrowers unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates. Such credit is provided with the goal of helping the borrower graduate to conventional credit sources so that clients are helped through a transitory phase and do not become permanent FSA borrowers. Data from a sample of 2,715 loans originated from October 1, 1993, through September 30, 1996, were used to examine how many borrowers with these loans had exited from the direct FLP and the reasons for exiting. 1, 2005) . Total cash farm income in the survey included other farm income which we assume is included in the Commission's definition of receipts.
Seventy
8 As discussed in Nwoha et al., the method of determining termination status almost surely underestimates the number of loans actually terminated.
9 Older farmers tend to be less indebted (Gale, 2003) so likely have lower credit needs.
10 Sixty-three farmers exited because of death out of the 2,705 farmers whose exit status was reported. There was no natural category among the four created for deceased farmers. The deceased farmers could have been put into a category of their own but then the specification of the economic and demographic variables (except for age) would not have made much sense.
11 The IIA implies none of the outcomes are close substitutes, see Greene. 12 To evaluate the probabilities, it is necessary to set the values of the independent variables at some level. In this study the continuous independent variables were set at their sample means. For binary variables the marginal probabilities cannot be interpreted as marginal changes since the variable can only change from zero to one. The estimated probability resulting from a change in a binary variable reported here is the estimated probability of a particular outcome with the binary variable set to one less the estimated probability with the binary variable set to zero.
13 Millions are used to facilitate convergence in maximizing the likelihood function and to keep the coefficients from becoming comparatively minute.
14 Diversification increases NFINTCFI increases from its lower limit of 0.
15 An alternative specification approach would be to use a credit scoring index. Such an index is the weighted value of various variables measuring borrower characteristics.
financial efficiency. Two of the variables in the estimated model, DA and REPAY, could be included in a credit score. Additional variables to measure liquidity, profitability and financial efficiency were tried in preliminary estimation but their estimated parameters were not significant.
16 In particular, missing observations were a problem for those exiting the program. If the FLM did not know the reason for exit, they could mark "unknown".
17 While all FO down payment loans go to beginning farmers, the majority of the beginning farmer loans were OL loans. 
